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The worker protection justification: 
Lessons from consumer law  
Catherine Barnard, Trinity College, Cambridge 
‘Overriding reasons relating to the public interest already recognised by the 
Court include the protection of workers’ 1 
A. Introduction 
Much consideration has been given to the face of the consumer in EU free movement and 
competition law.2 Much less time has been devoted to examining the face of the worker. This is 
surprising. The worker has been directly recognised by the Treaties since the inception of the EU, 
most obviously in respect of Article 45 TFEU on the free movement of workers and also Article 157 
TFEU on ‘equal pay for male and female workers’. Workers have also been recognised in other ways. 
They were the intended beneficiaries of the single market, as Article 117 EEC (now amended Article 
151 TFEU) made clear: 
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers ...They believe that such a development will ensue 
not only from the functioning of the common market, ... but also from the procedures 
provided for in this Treaty.  
Article 117 EEC was important for two reasons: first, it recognised that workers should enjoy 
(increasingly good) employment rights; and second, that migrant workers specifically, and the 
                                                          
*I am very grateful for the discussion with the participants in the seminar on justifications at City University in 
February 2014, as well as to those on the Czech Common Law Society Summer School, July 2014, to Niall 
O’Connor and to the editors of this volume for their careful comments.   
1 Joined cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte [2001] ECR I-7831, para. 
33. 
2 See eg A. Albors-Llorens and A. Jones, ‘The images of the “Consumer” in EU Competition Law’ in D. 
Leczykiewicz and S. Weatheril The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and 
Competition Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016); S. Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, 
Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 
working population more generally, would benefit from the opportunities created by the common, 
now single, market.  
Yet Article 117 EEC disguised a problem: how to reconcile the protection of social rights (largely 
delivered at national level) with the deregulatory push mandated at EU level by the four freedoms. 
For many years the Court of Justice was able to avoid adjudicating on this clash, usually by finding 
that EU law did not apply.3 So, for example, in Oebel,4 the defendant, accused of breaching 
restrictions on night work limits, complained that those rules interfered with free movement of 
goods. The Court rejected his argument. It said that the national rules did not have the effect of 
restricting free movement of goods between Member States; and since trade within the EU 
remained possible at all times, there was no breach of Article 34 TFEU. 
Where avoidance techniques proved impossible, the Court created the ‘worker protection’ public 
interest requirement to allow states to justify their rules, which they could do relatively easily, at 
least in the early days. So, in the early case of Webb,5 the Court found that the national rule, 
requiring temp agencies to be licensed, breached Article 56 TFEU, but could be justified on the 
grounds of worker protection. States could refuse licences where there was reason ‘to fear that such 
activities may harm good relations on the labour market or that the interests of the workforce 
affected are not adequately safeguarded’.6 
The accession to the EU of  states, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and, most recently, the Eastern 
European states, forced the Court to rethink its somewhat laissez-faire approach to states’ 
justification of national laws on worker protection grounds. Workers in these new countries (and 
their employers) saw access to the (labour) markets of the wealthier countries in northern Europe as 
a way of improving their own standard of living. Barriers put in the way by host state laws on 
workers’ rights potentially impeded these opportunities.  
This changing context set up the conditions for a clash between, on the one hand, the interests of 
national workers (usually in the northern European states) who wanted to see their jobs, and terms 
and conditions of employment protected, and, on the other, the interests of migrant workers 
(usually from the Eastern and Southern states) who wanted freer (unrestricted?) access to the 
                                                          
3 See eg Case C-190/98 Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493; Case C-67/96 Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751. 
4 Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993 
5 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305. 
6 Ibid, para. 19. 
markets in those host northern European states.7 The question for the Court was how to strike the 
balance between these two interests. 
2. The consumer protection case law 
Some, rather similar, battles had already been fought in the field of consumer protection, albeit with 
the Court working against a more incomplete canvas. Outside agriculture and competition law, 
consumers were not specifically recognised by the Treaty of Rome. Yet in the famous 1979 decision 
of Cassis de Dijon,8 two years before its analogue in Webb, the Court said that states were, in certain 
circumstances, free to protect the interests of national consumers (despite the absence of any 
mention of consumers in Article 36 TFEU). Cassis de Dijon concerned German rules requiring fruit 
liqueurs to have a minimum alcohol content of 25%. French cassis had an alcohol content of only 15-
20%. The German government justified its 25% rule for various public health/consumer protection 
reasons, including the fact that the German consumer was less likely to get drunk on the higher 
alcohol (German) drink. The Court did recognise that Germany could, in principle, invoke the 
consumer protection justification to protect German consumers from the error of their ways. 
However, the combined application of the mutual recognition and proportionality principles resulted 
in a decision favouring market integration and the removal of barriers (the 25% rule) which had been 
created by the host state in the name of consumer protection. 
Cassis de Dijon and the subsequent case law  forced the Court to address the question as to 
whether, and how, consumers should be protected. Some argued that the Court should adopt a 
restrictive interpretation of the four freedoms and so uphold paternalist national rules protecting 
consumers (such as the (not very bright) German consumers who risked drinking more of the lower 
alcohol fruit liqueur in the absence of the protective German rule). This paternalist approach 
supports the consumer protection model which, in turn, speaks to one of the objectives of EU law, 
namely ensuring a high level of consumer protection.9 However, upholding the consumer protection 
justification leads to less free movement of goods and services and so less competition, resulting in 
(German) consumers having less choice of goods to purchase (ie they are denied the choice between 
the German fruit liqueur with 25% alcohol or the French cassis with only 20%). In other words, the 
aggregate welfare of consumers would be reduced.  
                                                          
7 C. Barnard, ‘The protection of fundamental social right after Lisbon: A Question of Conflicts of Interests’ in S. 
de Vries, U. Bernitz and S. Weatherill, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2013). 
8 Case C-120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
9 See eg Art. 12 TFEU and Art. 114(3) TFEU. 
So, another school of thought argued that the Court should adopt an expansive reading of the free 
movement provisions, using them to strike down national rules drafted to protect consumers. This is 
done to ensure that the wider EU interest in securing the benefits of the single market for the 
consumer body as a whole. This wider interest is about consumers having greater choice of products 
and enjoying the benefits of greater competition between those products (cheaper prices and/or 
better quality goods). This, more liberal, reading of the Treaty provisions is described as embodying 
the consumer welfare approach.  
The genesis of the concept of consumer welfare lies in the field of competition law. For the 
Commission, ‘consumer welfare’ means the delivery of direct benefits to consumers through ‘lower 
prices, better quality and a wider choice of new or improved goods and services’.10 This approach 
has been endorsed by the General Court in GlaxoSmithKline11 (albeit subsequent judicial decisions 
have clouded the water as to what precisely is the objective of EU competition law).12  
A consumer welfare approach would suggest that any interference with the free movement principle 
by national legislation adopted on the grounds of consumer protection (ie the paternalist approach) 
should be scrutinised very carefully. And this is the position the Court of Justice has generally taken. 
Usually, it finds that the (Union interest) in consumer welfare prevails over the national interest in 
consumer protection and thus the free movement principle trumps the paternalist state interest in 
consumer protection.13 This may be due in part to a (neo)-liberal bias in the Court’s judgments but it 
may also be due, as Poiares Maduro has argued, to wider EU control over Member State regulation 
in the common market.14 
                                                          
10  See para. 5 of the Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty [now Article 102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings ((OJ [2009] C 45/7). 
11 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 at paras. 118 and 121-122.  
12 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I- 527, para. 22 ‘the function of those 
rules [Article 102 TFEU] is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public 
interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union’. See 
further Albors-Llorens and Jones, above n. 2. 
13 There are many examples but see eg Case C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-317; Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] 
ECR I-1923. 
14 M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998).  See also I. H Eliasoph, ‘A “Switch in Time” for the European Community? 
Lochner Discourse and the Recalibration of Economic and Social Rights in Europe’ (2010) Columbia Journal of 
European Law 468. 
3. Worker protection v worker welfare 
This chapter draws on the consumer literature to develop a distinction between notions of (1) 
worker protection and (2) worker welfare as a way of analysing the outcomes of the Court’s 
decisions in those cases where states have raised ‘worker protection’ as a public interest 
requirement to justify their rules. Where the Court recognises and upholds worker protection as a 
justification, it is essentially accepting that in the circumstance of this particular case the state’s 
paternalist interest in ensuring decent working conditions takes precedence over the wider EU 
interest in the realisation of a single market.  
By contrast, when the Court rejects the worker protection justification, it may be prioritising the 
Union interest in worker welfare. To labour lawyers ‘worker welfare’ may be synonymous to ‘worker 
protection’ but that is not the sense in which the term is being used in this chapter.15 As used here, 
the term ‘worker welfare’ (the term has been deliberately chosen to reflect the parallels with the 
consumer case law) means allowing workers across the EU the opportunity to work in whichever 
state they choose and on the terms dictated by the market (unless EU social law intervenes to 
provide specific protection). In other words, where the Court rejects the worker protection 
justification it may be recognising that in the circumstances of this particular case, the Union interest 
in the realisation of a single market (with the opportunities this brings for workers from poorer 
states to improve their life chances in wealthier states) should take precedence over the host state’s 
paternalist interest to protect (national) workers (and their jobs). 
As we shall see, a strict quantitative approach to the cases, suggests that the Court does indeed 
favour worker welfare over worker protection, just as it does consumer welfare over consumer 
protection (section C). However, as we shall also see, a more qualitative reading of the cases leads to 
more nuancedconclusions. When only the (non-migrating) employer stands to gain from invoking 
the free movement principle, there is some evidence Court favours the state interest in worker 
protection (section D). By contrast, when migrants are exercising their rights of free movement 
                                                          
15 One other note for labour lawyers: the search of the Court’s jurisprudence on ‘worker protection’ did not 
reveal any cases which engaged with the question of who is a ‘worker’. This is a vexed question in national 
employment law and, increasingly, in EU substantive law because it raises the fundamental question of the 
personal scope of the protection. Under English law, for example, the term ‘worker’ is broader than 
‘employee’. Under Article 157 TFEU on equal pay, the term worker may also include the dependent ‘self-
employed’. Generally, these issues are not engaged with at all when it comes to considering the worker 
protection justification, albeit in Case C-577/10 Commission v Belgium the Court talked of the public interest 
requirement of ‘protecting workers, including self-employed service providers’. 
under Article 45 TFEU or where businesses are exercising their rights to freedom of establishment in 
a state with lower labour costs under Article 49 TFEU, or exercising freedom to provide services 
using posted workers under Article 56 TFEU, the Court is forced to balance the state interest in 
worker protection with the wider Union interest in worker welfare. It will be argued that in these 
cases the Court tends to favour worker welfare unless the host state raises a genuine worker 
protection concern and can show the measures it takes are proportionate. It will therefore be 
argued that while the presumption in the free movement case law is in favour of worker welfare, 
particularly where national rules are overtly or covertly protectionist, where there are genuine 
concerns for workers (both national and migrant/posted or just migrant/posted), the Court will 
upheld the worker protection justification or may do so in the future if the rules were modified in 
some way. So the Court’s position is in fact less biased in favour of worker welfare than a pure 
quantitative analysis might suggest (section E).  
This chapter concludes with the suggestion that while the consumer case law has helped to tease 
out some of the nuances as to when the worker protection justification is successfully invoked, it will 
be argued that the parallels are not as robust as would first appear (section F).  
4. Methodology 
The research question, then, is whether the Court’s case law does lead to the prioritisation of worker 
welfare over worker protection, in much the same way as the Court’s consumer case law generally 
prioritises consumer welfare over consumer protection. To help find an answer to this question, a 
simple methodology was used. A search was made in the Curia database16 of all cases up to 1 July 
2015, for the phrases ‘worker protection’ and ‘employee protection’, and the analogues such as 
‘protection of workers’ and ‘protection of employees’. A search was also made for cases where the 
phrase ‘social protection of workers’ was used (this often came up in the posting of workers cases, 
which form the bulk of the cases in this data set), which seems to be a synonym for ‘worker 
protection’.17 This search did not, however, catch all the cases (most notable by their omission were 
the judgments in Rush Portuguesa18 and Van der Elst,19 known by the author to be important in this 
                                                          
16 http://curia.europa.eu/. 
17 See eg Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota [2010] ECR I-9133, paras. 46-47. For an earlier example, see Case C-
272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, para. 16. For an example in the field of workers, see Case C-202/11 Las , para. 
28. 
18 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR 1-1417, paragraph 18. 
19 Case C-43/93 Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803. 
field). Therefore, a further check was made against the decisions cited in the case law which came 
up in the Curia database search to ensure that all the main cases had been identified.  
Each case was then considered and those concerning the interpretation of EU social policy directives 
were discarded since they are not relevant to the enquiry about the use of the worker protection 
justification by states in the free movement context. This left 30 or so cases. These cases were then 
divided up into (1) those which were the result of Article 258 TFEU enforcement proceedings where 
an outcome is clear ; and (2) those involving an Article 267 TFEU reference, where it may be harder 
to determine an outcome due to the fact that that it is the national court that makes the final 
decision on, say, the proportionality of the measure and the final decision of the national court (if 
any) may not be subsequently reported/available. The Article 258 TFEU cases were then analysed to 
consider, where possible, if the state won or lost, and why. This quantitative analysis of the case law 
was then supplemented by a more qualitative analysis of the decisions.  
B. The Worker Protection Justification and its Limits 
In order to provide the context for the subsequent discussion, the chapter begins with a brief 
examination of the worker protection public interest requirement, the contexts in which the term 
has been invoked, and the limitations on the use of the justification. 
1. The worker protection justification 
1.1  Developing the worker protection justification 
As we saw in the introduction, the basic settlement at the time of the Treaty of Rome was that social 
policy was a value to be recognised by the EU20 but actually delivered largely by the Member States. 
This meant it was inevitable that Member States would invoke worker protection as a justification to 
defend challenges to their social legislation, and that the Court would eventually have to recognise 
that justification, as it did in Webb. By the early 1990s, the Court said in Gouda21 that ‘the protection 
of workers’ was among the list of public interest justifications which it had already recognised:  
 14.In this respect, the overriding reasons relating to the public interest which the Court has 
already recognized include professional rules intended to protect recipients of the service ...; 
protection of intellectual property ...; the protection of workers (Case 279/80 Webb [1981] 
ECR 3305, paragraph 19; Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco v EVI [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 
                                                          
20 See specifically Title III on Social Policy 
21 Case C-288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v Commissariaat voor de Media 
[1991] ECR I-4007, paras. 13-14. 
14; Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR 1-1417, paragraph 1822); consumer 
protection ... 
 15. Lastly, as the Court has consistently held, the application of national provisions to 
providers of services established in other Member States must be such as to guarantee the 
achievement of the intended aim and must not go beyond that which is necessary in order 
to achieve that objective. In other words, it must not be possible to obtain the same result 
by less restrictive rules. 
Since Gouda, the ‘worker protection’ justification has been recognised by the Court in over 30 cases 
(see tables 1-3 below). Its existence as an overriding reason in the public interest (ORPI) has also 
been confirmed by the Services Directive 2006/123 where worker protection sits alongside the 
consumer protection justification:23 
 The notion [ORPI] as recognised in the case law of the Court of Justice covers at least the 
following grounds: ... the maintenance of order in society; social policy objectives; the 
protection of the recipients of services; consumer protection; the protection of workers, 
including the social protection of workers. 
1.2 Extending the worker protection justification 
Thus the early case law was clear: worker protection is an important public interest justification 
which was used by states in the way that labour lawyers would understand it: to justify national laws 
providing substantive protection to the weaker party (the employee). However, in subsequent cases 
defendant states tried their luck – or at the very least tried to stretch the contexts in which the 
worker protection justification could be invoked. For example, in Case C-577/10 Commission v 
                                                          
22 It is not entirely clear why the Court cited para.18 of Rush Portuguesa to justify the worker protection 
justification since the paragraph seems to say something different: ‘Finally, it should be stated, in response to 
the concern expressed in this connection by the French Government, that [Union] law does not preclude 
Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of 
industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country 
the employer is established; nor does [Union] law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by 
appropriate means.’ Thus, this paragraph could mean that the application of labour law rules to migrant 
workers (i) does not amount to a restriction on free movement of services or (ii) that it is a restriction, but one 
which is (always) justified and proportionate.  
23 OJ [2006] L376/36Recital 40. 
Belgium,24 Belgium tried to bring under the umbrella of the worker protection justification the need 
to protect the treasury as well as the need to create a level playing field. The Court was prepared, in 
principle, to accept the Belgian justification: 
the objective of combating fraud, particularly social security fraud, and preventing abuse, in 
particular detecting ‘bogus self-employed persons’ and combating undeclared work, can 
form part not only of the objective of the financial balance of social security systems, but 
also of the objectives of preventing unfair competition and social dumping and protecting 
workers, including self-employed service providers. 
However, the Court stressed that any controls imposed had to comply with the limits imposed by EU 
law and could not render the freedom to provide services illusory.25  
An even wider – and more controversial – reading of the worker protection justification26 can be 
seen in Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg,27 where the host state, Luxembourg, argued that 
the worker protection justification included protecting the jobs of home state workers. Specifically, 
Luxembourg argued that its labour market needed to be protected from ‘being disrupted by a flood 
of workers who are nationals of non-member countries’.28 Somewhat surprisingly, given its long-
stated opposition to the use of justifications to serve economic purposes,29 the Court may have 
recognised this as an aspect of the worker protection justification30: ‘the desire to avoid disturbances 
                                                          
24 EU:C:2012:814, para.45. See also Case C-549/13 Bundesruckerei v Stadt Dortmund EU:C:2014:2235, para. 35, 
Case C-315/13 De Clercq EU:C:2014:2408, para. 65 
25 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, para. 17. 
26 Luxembourg also ran a more traditional argument based on worker protection but this was rejected by the 
Court because the requirements imposed in connection with obtaining a licence were disproportionate (paras. 
29-36) 
27 Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191. 
28 Para. 37. See also Case C-168/04 Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I-9041. In this way, the Court echoes the 
Spaak report: ‘The European Commission will decide on the necessary protection measures in order to avoid 
an inflow of labor which would be dangerous for the standard of living or employment of workers in certain 
specified industries, without affecting the rights acquired by foreign workers’. 
29 For a full discussion of this subject see S. Arrowsmith, ‘Rethinking the Approach to Economic Justifications 
under the EU’s free movement rules’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 307. 
30 The doubt relates to the fact that the Court cites para. 13 of Rush Portuguesa, not para. 18 (which was 
subsequently used as the authority for the worker protection justification), yet para. 13 concerns Article 216 of 
the Act of Accession (ie a Treaty provision) which was ‘intended to prevent disturbances on the employment 
market following Portugal's accession, both in Portugal and in the other Member States, due to large and 
on the labour market is undoubtedly an overriding reason of general interest’.31 This point has now 
been picked up by the UK’s New Settlement Decision: 32 
If overriding reasons of public interest make it necessary, free movement of workers may be 
restricted by measures proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Encouraging 
recruitment, reducing unemployment, protecting vulnerable workers and averting the risk of 
seriously undermining the sustainability of social security systems are reasons of public 
interest recognised in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union for 
this purpose, based on a case by case analysis. 
However, the Court is not generally sympathetic to such arguments, or finds ways round them on 
the facts, as it did in Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg itself. In Case C-445/03 the Court said 
that ‘workers employed by an undertaking established in a Member State and who are deployed to 
another Member State for the purposes of providing services there do not purport to gain access to 
the labour market of that second State, as they return to their country of origin or residence after 
the completion of their work’.33 In other words posted workers do not enter the Luxembourg labour 
market and so do not threaten national jobs and so Luxembourg could not take action. In Case C-
244/04 Commission v Germany,34 the Court gave a similar reason to reject a German rule requiring 
at least one year’s prior employment by the posting undertaking in order to ensure ‘the protection 
of workers, the safeguarding of the Member States’ prerogatives in respect of access to their 
employment market and the prevention of social dumping’.35 
2. Limitations 
As Gouda shows, even where the worker protection justification is successfully invoked, the steps 
taken must comply with the principle of proportionality (paragraph 15). Subsequent case law has 
elaborated on the limits on the use by the Member States of the justification, limitations which 
(unsurprisingly) reveal a number of commonalities with the general case law on justifications. They 
can be summarised as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
immediate movements of workers’. The Luxembourg law dated from 1972; Portugal acceded to the EU in 
1986. 
31 Para.38. 
32 The UK New Settlement Decision, 18-19 February 2016, section D.(1)(a), emphasis added. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Case C-244/04 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-885. 
35 Para. 57. Cf C-49/98 Finalarte, para. 38 where the national court pointed out the protectionist aim behind 
the national law but the Court was not swayed: ‘that declared intention is not conclusive’. See also case C-
164/99 Portugaia Construções {2002] ECR I-787, para. 27.  
First, the Court (usually) requires evidence to support the justification: mere general assertions are 
not enough.36 Secondly and relatedly, the Court requires that there must be a direct link between 
the national law and the protection of the worker otherwise the justification is not made out; in 
other words, the national legislation must ‘secure the protection of [posted] workers’.37 So in Seco,38 
the Court said that an obligation requiring a provider of services to pay employers' contributions to 
the host State's fund could not be justified where those contributions conferred no social advantage 
on the workers concerned.39 Similarly, in Van der Elst,40 as in Case C-445/03 Commission v 
Luxembourg, the Court rejected the French argument that a Belgian company posting Moroccan 
workers had to have a French work permit for those Moroccan workers in order to regulate access 
to the French labour market for workers from non-member countries.41 Since those workers did not 
intend to gain access the French labour market, the justification was not made out.42  
Thirdly, in the cases on free movement of services, the Court takes into account the protection 
already provided in the home state when assessing what (further) steps the host state can take.43 So 
in Guiot, a case where the host state required the posting employer to pay employer’s contributions 
to the state’s social security fund, the Court said that the public interest of worker protection did not 
apply where the workers enjoyed ‘the same protection, or essentially similar protection, by virtue of 
employer's contributions already paid by the employer in the Member State of establishment’.44 
Putting it another way, as the Court did in Arblade,45 only if the employer's contributions to the host 
                                                          
36 Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany (Volkswagen) [2007] I-8995, para. 74. 
37 Case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller GmbH & Co. KG v José Filipe Pereira Félix [2004] ECR I-9553, para. 38; Case C-
279/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-1425, para. 22. 
38 Joined Cases 62 and 63/81 Société anonyme de droit français Seco and Société anonyme de droit français 
Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d'assurance contre la vieillesse et l'invalidité [1982] ECR 223. 
39 Para. 10. 
40 Case C-43/93 Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803. 
41 Para. 20. 
42 Para. 21. 
43 Case C-165/98 Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL [2001] 
ECR I-2189, para. 40. 
44 Case 272/84 Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA [1996] I-1905, paras. 18-19. 
45 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils 
SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL [1999] I-8453. 
State's fund conferred on workers an advantage capable of providing them with real additional 
protection would it be possible to justify the payment of the contributions in question.46  
There are other limitations on the use of the worker protection justification which the Court has 
referred to in the worker protection cases: considerations of a purely administrative nature cannot 
make lawful a restriction of the freedom to provide services justified on the grounds of worker 
protection;47 nor can those of a purely economic nature (although as we have seen, the Court is 
increasingly ambivalent on this).48 Measures taken to achieve the worker protection objective must 
also not discriminate between the public and private sectors,49 must be consistent,50 transparent,51 
and, of course, proportionate.  
C. The outcome in cases where states invoke worker protection  
This case law considered so far already shows that there can be different understandings of the 
worker protection justification, and that the Court may or may not accept either the justification of 
the proportionality of the measures. We turn now to consider more systematically the outcomes in 
the cases where the worker protection justification has been raised by states.  
There have been 31 cases where the state has invoked ‘worker protection’ or its analogues as a 
justification to restrict free movement. Of those 31 cases, there were nine enforcement proceedings 
(see table 1, column 1) and 22 preliminary references (see table 2, column 1). Of the nine 
enforcement proceedings in only one did the defendant Member State win (Case C-490/04 
Commission v Germany) and there only in part. In all other cases the state lost because it offered no 
justification, or because the justification was not made out, or, more commonly, the state’s actions 
were not proportionate (see table 1, columns 2-6). 
Case Freedom State 
wins 
State loses: 
No 
justification 
offered 
 or available 
State loses: 
Justification 
not  
made out 
State loses: 
Measure  
disproportionate 
                                                          
46 Para. 54. 
47 Case C-493/99 Commission v Germany [2001] I-8163 para. 21. 
48 Case C-164/99 Portuguaia Construções [2002] ECR I-787. 
49 Case C-549/13 Bundesruckerei v Stadt Dortmund EU:C:2014:2235, para. 32. 
50 Case C-79/01 Payroll Data services [2002] ECR I-8923, para. 37. 
51 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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Comn v Germany  
Capital 
 
   X 
Case C-244/04 
Comn v Germany 
Services 
(posting) 
   X 
X 
Case C-168/04 
Comn v Austria 
Services 
(posting) 
   X 
Case C-319/06 
Comn v Lux 
services  X 
(insufficient 
transparency
) 
 
X 
 
Case C-577/10 
Comn v Belgium  
Services    X 
Table 1 The outcome in Article 258 TFEU cases where the Member States raised worker protection as 
a justification 
A simple win/lose analysis is harder to conduct in the case of the 22 Article 267 references since, by 
their very nature, the final decision on the compatibility of national law with EU law should be taken 
by the national courts. Nevertheless, sometimes the Court makes clear that the host state has won 
or lost, or at least sends a clear signal in that direction. In order to reflect this in the analysis, the 
cases were categorised as: 
(1) those cases where the Court made it very clear that the national rule was lawful (‘state 
wins’); 
(2) those where the Court gave an indication that the state rule was justified and 
proportionate (‘likely state wins’);  
(3) those cases where the Court made it clear that the state rule could not be justified (‘state 
loses’); 
(4) those where it gave a strong indication to that effect (‘likely state loses’); and  
(5) those cases where the outcome was not clear.  
The application of these categories can be seen in table 2, columns 2-6. 
Case State 
wins/likely 
state wins 
State loses: 
No justification 
offered or 
available 
State loses: 
Justification not made 
out 
State loses: 
Measure disproportionate 
Oebel X    
Webb X52    
Seco   X  
Rush Portuguesa   X  
Marchandise X    
Van der Elst   X [X] 
Guiot   X  
Arblade X  X X 
Mazzoleni    X53 
Finalarte     
Toolex Alpha AB X    
Portugaia Constr.  X  X 
Uberseering   X  
PDS    X 
Wollf & Muller X54    
Laval   X55  
Viking   X56 X57 
Rüffert    X 
Santos Palhota    X 
Las    X 
Bundesruckerei    X 
De Clercq X58    
Table 2: The outcome in Article 267 TFEU references when states raised the worker protection justification 
A summary of the reasons given by the Court as to why the state lost (no justification offered, 
justification not made out, national measure not proportionate) can be found in Table 3. 
Outcomes Number of cases 
State wins  
State wins totally 3 
State wins in part 1 
Likely state wins 4 
Likely state wins in part 1 
                                                          
52 Although ultimately left to the national court to decide. 
53 Strong likelihood national rule not proportionate. 
54 Proportionality left to the national court, but with suggestion measure is lawful. 
55 Defendants were trade unions, not the state. 
56 Defendants were trade unions, not the state. Justification ultimately left to the national court to decide 
57 Proportionality left to the national court to decide. 
58 Strong hint national measure proportionate 
Total 9 
State loses  
State loses totally 13 
State loses in part 1 
Likely state loses 2 
Total 16 
Unclear 2 
Table 3 Summary of outcomes in the Article 267 TFEU cases 
Table 3 shows us that, at its broadest, the states lost in 16 cases and won in 9. Table 4 shows that 
generally states lost either because they failed to substantiate the justification (approximately 8 
cases) or the steps taken were not proportionate (approximately 9 cases). From this, we can say that 
the state loses in nearly double the number of cases than it wins. If, for reasons explained below, the 
goods cases are removed (Oebel, Merchandise and Toolex Alpha), the figure of 9 for ‘state wins’ is 
reduced to 6, as compared to 16 ‘state loses’. If we look at ‘state wins totally’ and add to this the 
figures for the state wins in enforcement proceedings, states win in 4 cases (three Article 267 TFEU 
references, one Article 258 TFEU enforcement proceedings) and lose in 22 cases. This gives a win: 
lose ratio of 2:11. Putting it another way states win in 15% of cases and lose in 85% of cases. 
Although this analysis may seem crude, the raw data is overwhelming. The quantitative analysis 
supports the view that the Court is impatient when states raise the worker protection justification as 
a limitation on free movement rights.59 Putting it another way, the quantitative data suggests that 
worker protection is being marginalised in favour of broader arguments based on worker welfare, 
although the Court has never made this point explicitly. However, appearances can be deceptive. 
The discussion below suggests the reality is more complex. It will be argued that a distinction needs 
to be drawn between those cases where the justification is invoked to protect the national worker in 
the face of challenges to national rules, often by business using the four freedoms (section D) and 
those where the worker protection justification is invoked in the context of migration, particularly by 
workers under Article 45 TFEU or by companies providing services using posted workers under 
Article 56 TFEU (section E). In cases involving national workers and a more traditional labour law 
context (worker v employer) the Court seems more willing to uphold the worker protection 
justification than in the cases involving migration, provided there are genuine worker protection 
                                                          
59 Earlier research tends to support this view more generally in the field of justifications: C. Barnard, 
Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?’ in C. Barnard and O. 
Odudu, The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 
concerns. While the dynamic is more complex in cases involving migrant/posted workers even here 
the Court may be more willing to accept the worker protection justification where there are genuine 
concerns about ensuring that migrating workers enjoy employment protection.  
D. The ‘National’ Worker Cases 
1. Introduction 
In this section, we look at those cases where the state is invoking the worker protection justification 
on behalf of (mainly) national workers against claims based on free movement (of goods, 
establishment, services and capital) brought by business (or by the Commission on behalf of 
business seeking to ensure their free movement rights). It will be argued that these cases show that, 
provided a genuine claim is made by the defendant state, the Court has broad sympathy with the 
worker protection justification and will prioritise it. The testing ground for this argument is the free 
movement of goods, where the earliest cases arose. 
2. Free movement of goods 
In respect of free movement of goods, when host states invoke national rules to protect national 
consumers from imports, the Court is generally sceptical. Most famously, as we saw in in Cassis de 
Dijon, the Court rejected the German justification that consumers would be protected by a 
prohibition on the import of the weaker French cassis; access to those goods combined with 
adequate labelling would be a more proportionate response. In this way, consumer welfare would 
be increased given the greater choice that free movement of goods would bring to consumers. This 
is not an isolated example: rules limiting the ingredients in beer60 and pasta,61 all justified on the 
grounds of consumer protection/public health, were successfully challenged as being contrary to 
Article 34 TFEU, as were controls on advertising that claimed to protect consumers but were in 
reality placing unfair limits on competition.62 In these cases consumer welfare prevailed over 
consumer protection. 
By contrast, in the three free movement of goods cases where worker protection was at issue, the 
Court has favoured worker protection over worker welfare. First, in Oebel,63 considered above, the 
                                                          
60 Case C-178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. 
61 Case C-202/82 Commission v France [1984] ECR 933; Case C-90/86 Zoni [1988] ECR 4285. 
62 Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1998] ECR I-4657; C-303/97 Kessler [1999] ECR I-513; Case C-220/98 Estée 
Lauder [2000] ECR I-117. 
63 Case 155/80 Summary proceedings against Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993. 
Court ruled that the restriction on night-working did not breach Article 34 TFEU because the rules 
were non- discriminatory, and the restrictions on transport and delivery did not affect trade 
between Member States. The Court also noted the special nature of the sector:the prohibition in 
the bread and confectionery industry on working before 4 a.m. is’ designed to improve working 
conditions in a manifestly sensitive industry, in which the production process exhibits particular 
characteristics resulting from both the nature of the product and the habits of consumers’. 64 
Second, Marchandise65 concerned a French law prohibiting the employment of staff on Sundays 
after 12 noon. This case was part of the rather obscure series of decisions on Sunday trading which 
ultimately led to the Keck ‘revolution’.66 For the purposes of this chapter, the interesting point is 
that the Court emphasised the autonomy of the national social legislation: 
national rules governing the opening hours of retail premises reflect certain political and 
economic choices in so far as their purpose is to ensure that working and non-working 
hours are so arranged as to accord with national or regional socio-cultural characteristics, 
and that, in the present state of [Union] law, is a matter for the Member States.  
The Court concluded that the ‘restrictive effects on trade which may stem from such rules do not 
seem disproportionate to the aim pursued’.67 
Third, Toolex Alpha68 concerned national rules which included a general prohibition on the industrial 
use of trichloroethylene. The Court said the system of individual exemptions, granted subject to 
conditions, established by the Swedish regulation appeared ‘appropriate and proportionate in that it 
offers increased protection for workers, whilst at the same time taking account of the undertakings' 
requirements in the matter of continuity.’ The Court referred to a range of EU health and safety 
legislation to support its conclusion.69 
These three cases suggest a prioritising of worker protection over the Union interest in creating the 
single market, although the sample size is too small to make such a generalisaiton with confidence. It 
should also be noted that in Oebel and Marchandise the facts hovered on the outer edges of EU law 
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(1994) 31 CMLRev. 459. 
67 Para. 13. 
68 Case C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681. 
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and Toolex Alpha concerned a product raised serious health concerns. Nevertheless, we can say that 
in these few cases where worker protection has been raised, unlike in the field of consumer law, the 
Court seemed keen to protect the weaker party in the face of (aggressive?) single market challenges 
from business.  
3. The other freedoms 
The position is somewhat different in respect of the other freedoms. There are four cases - two on 
freedom of establishment (Uberseering70 and Payroll Data Services (PDS)71), one on capital (Case C-
112/05 Commission v Germany (Volkswagen)72) and one on free movement of services (Webb73) - 
where the defendant state invoked worker/employee protection as a justification for its rules 
protecting national workers in the face of challenges by business/the Commission. In only one of the 
cases (Webb) did the Court suggest that the justification was made out. 
In both Uberseering and Volkswagen, the Court considered that the defendant state had failed to 
make out the link between the measure adopted and the justification alleged. Uberseering 
concerned a German rule which denied the legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to be a 
party to legal proceedings, to a company properly incorporated in the Netherlands where it had its 
registered office. The Court said that such a measure was tantamount to an outright negation of the 
freedom of establishment conferred on companies by Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU.74 The Court said 
that ‘It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, such as the 
protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation 
authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on 
freedom of establishment’75 but this was not the case on the facts.76  
Commission v Germany concerned the German Volkswagen law limiting the voting rights of every 
shareholder to 20% of Volkswagen’s share capital, requiring a majority of over 80% of the shares 
represented for resolutions of the general assembly, and allowing, in derogation from the general 
law, the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony each to appoint two representatives to the 
company’s supervisory board. The Court found these rules breached Article 63 TFEU. On the 
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74 Case C-208/00 Uberseering [2002] ECR I-9919, para. 93 
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question of justification and proportionality, the Court said that Germany had been unable to 
explain, ‘beyond setting out general considerations as to the need for protection against a large 
shareholder which might by itself dominate the company, why, in order to meet the objective of 
protecting Volkswagen’s workers, it is appropriate and necessary for the Federal and State 
authorities to maintain a strengthened and irremovable position in the capital of that company’. 77 
In the third case, PDS,78 the Court thought the host state’s rules were out of date and inconsistent. 
National legislation required that undertakings with fewer than 250 employees, which wished to 
entrust the preparation and printing of their pay slips to data processing centres (DPCs), could have 
recourse only to those DPCs established and staffed exclusively by persons registered with certain 
professional bodies in Italy. This requirement did not apply where DPCs offered their services to 
undertakings with more than 250 employees. The Court said that ‘since the tasks in question cannot 
be any less complex when the number of salaried staff concerned increases, the disputed provision 
goes, in any event, beyond what is necessary to attain its objective of protection.’79 
In Webb, by contrast, as we saw above, the Court was sympathetic to the worker protection 
justification, particularly having emphasised (as in Oebel) the sensitivity of the sector (temp 
agencies).80 Nevertheless, the Court required the national court to check that, in granting licences, 
the host state (1) did not discriminate on the grounds of nationality, and (2) took into account the 
evidence and guarantees already produced by the provider of the services for the pursuit of his 
activities in the home state.81 
4. Preliminary conclusions 
Thus the tenor of Webb fits with the dominant worker protection theme found in the three 
cases on free movement of goods; the Court considered that there was a genuine concern 
about workers who needed protection. The failure of the worker protection justification in 
the establishment and capital cases can be explained more on the basis of the Court’s 
general jurisprudence on limitations on the use of justifications field (see section B above) 
than by any outright rejection of the worker protection justification (namely, the states 
failed to make a proper case, to be consistent and to act proportionately). Taken as a whole, 
these seven cases (three goods, two establishment, one capital, one services) point to the 
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provisional conclusion that, provided the thresholds outlined in section B are satisfied, the 
Court is broadly sympathetic to claims based on worker protection raised in standard labour 
law situations (business v national worker). 
E. Migrant and posted worker cases 
1. Prioritising of worker welfare 
We now turn to focus on those cases where one group of workers’ interests (generally poorer but 
ambitious migrant workers) are being pitted against another group (generally the immobile, possibly 
unionised, national workers). In these cases the state may raise the worker protection justification 
ostensibly to protect the (migrant) workers’ interests but in fact also as a cover to protect the 
national workers’ interests, specifically their jobs. While the state’s positon is understandable, the 
Court is sensitive to ‘worker protection’ being used either to obstruct free movement or, worse from 
an EU point of view, as a form of protectionism. In these cases, the Court will reject the state’s 
justification and so deliver worker welfare, namely the opportunity for  workers to improve their life 
chances through employment in other Member States, either as migrant workers under Article 45 
TFEU or posted workers under Article 56 TFEU. 82  
Las83 is a good example of worker protection being used to obstruct free movement. The case 
concerned a Flemish law providing that only the Flemish text of a cross-border employment contract 
was authentic (and not, for example, a text in English). Belgium sought to justify its requirement on 
the basis of the need to ensure ‘the protection of employees by enabling them to examine 
employment documents in their own language and to enjoy the effective protection of the workers’ 
representative bodies and administrative and judicial bodies called upon to recognise those 
documents, and, finally, to ensure the efficacy of the checks and supervision of the employment 
inspectorate’. While the Court recognised worker protection as a justification, it found the rules 
disproportionate. The establishment of free and informed consent between the parties required 
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those parties to be able to draft their contract in a language other than the official language of 
Belgium.84  
In some of the cases involving posted workers the Court also seems to consider the worker 
protection justification as coming closer to protectionism. The Court therefore rejects it outright or 
finds the steps taken to be disproportionate. So, for example, the Court said that host state laws 
requiring the posted worker to have been employed by the service provider for at least 6 months in 
the case of Luxembourg85 (a year in the case of Germany)86 were not lawful. A requirement for the 
posted workers to have individual work permits which were only granted where the labour market 
situation so allowed was also not compatible with the EU law.87 The Court has also said that a 
requirement for the service provider to provide, for the purposes of obtaining a work permit, a bank 
guarantee to cover costs in the event of repatriation of the worker at the end of his deployment was 
not permitted,88 nor was a requirement that the work be licensed,89 nor was a rule that in order for 
an EU posting confirmation to be issued, the posted worker must have been employed by the 
sending company for at least a year previously and to have an indefinite contract with that 
company.90 
Perhaps, most extreme was Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg91 concerning a requirement, 
that posted workers had employment contracts of indefinite duration in force for at least six months 
with their employer in the state of origin. Luxembourg argued that this rule addressed the risk of 
abusive exploitation of workers from non-member countries through the use of precarious and 
poorly-remunerated contracts while also protecting against the dangers of distortion of competition 
through social dumping.92 The Court rejected this argument. It said that the Luxembourg rule could 
not be regarded as constituting an appropriate means since it involved formalities and periods which 
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were ‘liable to discourage the free provision of services through the medium of workers who are 
nationals of non-member countries’.93 Once again, worker welfare prevails. 
The Court has also considered control measures in cases not involving posted workers. So, in Case C-
577/10 Commission v Belgium,94 the Court found a Belgian requirement, imposing on migrant self-
employed service providers the obligation to make a prior declaration, breached Article 56 TFEU. 
Although the Court recognised that the ‘objective of combating fraud, particularly social security 
fraud, and preventing abuse, in particular detecting ‘bogus self-employed persons’ and combating 
undeclared work, can form part not only of the objective of the financial balance of social security 
systems, but also of the objectives of preventing unfair competition and social dumping and 
protecting workers, including self-employed service providers’, the ‘very detailed information’ 
required was disproportionate.95 
Protecting national jobs was also the motivating force behind the trade unions’ decisions to call their 
members out on strike in the well-known cases of Viking96 and Laval97. In Laval, the Court recognised 
‘the right to take collective action for the protection of the workers of the host State against possible 
social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public interest’.98 However, it said that on the 
facts the collective action could not be justified where the negotiations on pay, formed part of a 
national context characterised by a lack of provisions, of any kind, which were sufficiently precise 
and accessible that they did not render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an 
undertaking to determine the obligations with which it was required to comply as regards minimum 
pay.99 In Viking, the Court recognised the Finnish trade unions’ right to take strike action to protest 
at the loss of jobs to Estonia but only where strict conditions were satisfied and the strike action was 
the last resort. These points were left to the national court to decide (the case was eventually 
settled) but there is a sense in the judgment that the unions were unlikely to make out either the 
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justification or the proportionality test. Once again, it seems that in these cases worker welfare 
prevailed over state/trade union interest in worker protection. 
2 A more nuanced approach 
The general tenor of the cases considered so far in this section suggests that, unlike in the cases 
involving national workers, there is a prioritising of worker welfare (of migrant or posted workers) 
over worker protection. However, there are cases where the Court demonstrates, as it did in the 
national worker cases Oebel and Webb, an awareness that migrant and posted workers risk 
exploitation. So, for example, in Guiot, the Court talked of the social protection of workers in the 
construction industry [which] may however, because of conditions specific to that sector, constitute 
an overriding requirement justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services.100 And given 
the risks facing posted workers in these sectors ‘control measures’ such as inspection requirements, 
document checks and the like, may need to be put in place by the host state as the Court recognised 
in Arblade:101 
The effective protection of workers in the construction industry, particularly as regards 
health and safety matters and working hours, may require that certain documents are kept 
on site, or at least in an accessible and clearly identified place in the territory of the host 
Member State, so that they are available to the authorities of that State responsible for 
carrying out checks, particularly where there exists no organised system for cooperation or 
exchanges of information between Member States as provided for in Article 4 of Directive 
96/71.102  
The importance of proportionate control measures is in fact a theme of a number of posted workers 
cases. For example, in Case C-244/04 Commission v. Germany,103 the Court said that the host state 
could insist that the service provider furnished a ‘simple prior declaration certifying that the 
situation of the workers concerned is lawful’, particularly in the light of the requirements of 
residence, work visas and social security cover in the Member States where the provider employs 
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them.104 In Case C-445/03 Commission v. Luxembourg105 the Court said that the host state could 
require the service provider to report beforehand to the local authorities on the presence of one or 
more posted workers, the anticipated duration of their presence and the provision or provisions of 
services justifying the deployment106 and, in Case C-490/04 Commission v. Germany,107 that the host 
state could require a (reasonable) number of those documents to be translated into German.  
3. Preliminary conclusions 
In conclusion, the general tenor of the case law involving migrant and posted workers has been to 
favour worker welfare over worker protection, a view borne out by the quantitative analysis. This is 
particularly so in cases involving what the Court considers to be protectionism by the host state. It is 
also true that, in respect of cases involving antiquated rules which may have lost their original 
rationale, the Court will reject the worker protection justification. We saw this in Las and Seco. It can 
also be seen in Case C-493/99 Commission v Germany where German law said that companies could 
not provide trans-frontier services on the German market as part of a consortium unless they had 
their seat, or at least an establishment, in Germany employing their own staff, and had concluded a 
company-wide collective agreement for those staff. The Court found such rules constituted a clear 
breach of the Treaty provisions on free movement of services. 
However, where there are genuine concerns about potential abuse or mistreatment of migrant or 
posted workers the Court will uphold proportionate control measures (mainly against the backcloth 
of the Posted Workers Directive 96/71,108 which allows host states to insist on applying the 
substance of its rules, but does not cover control measures to ensure those rules and others are 
enforced109). Indeed, in its case law on control measures the Court comes close to providing a 
legislative catalogue as to what is – and is not – acceptable in the name of worker protection. 
Paradoxically, the decisions (considered in section E.1) which apparently favour worker welfare may 
go some way to promoting worker protection in future situations, not just of national workers but of 
migrant/posted workers. By giving a detailed consideration of, say, the proportionality criteria, the 
Court is essentially providing the host state with a template as to what it can lawfully do in the 
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future to protect vulnerable posted workers. Thus, once again, in these cases the Court’s approach 
upholds the function of labour law, protecting the weaker party (ie the domestic or migrant worker). 
In these situations there is therefore not so much difference between the cases involving domestic 
workers (section D) and those involving migrant/posted workers (section E). A qualitative analysis of 
the cases therefore suggests that the Court is trying to strike a careful balance between, on the one 
hand, protecting workers and, on the other, preventing protectionism. Putting it succinctly, in 
appropriate cases the Court does allows worker protection but not protectionism. 
F. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the ‘face’ of the worker in the Court’s case law on 
‘worker protection’ justifications. Drawing on the analysis of the Court’s case law on the ‘consumer 
protection’ justification, the chapter has made a distinction between cases which support worker 
protection (ie upholding paternalist national legislation protecting individual workers) and those 
which uphold worker welfare (ie removing national legislation which protects workers in the name 
of allowing EU workers to benefit from free movement).  
A bare statistical analysis suggests that the Court’s case law does lead to the prioritisation of worker 
welfare over worker protection, in much the same way as the Court’s consumer case law prioritises 
consumer welfare over consumer protection. The Court does have acute antennae for rules, justified 
in the name of worker protection, which in fact have passed their sell-by date or are protectionist of 
the national market. It has therefore used the Euro-worker, in much the same way as it has the Euro-
consumer ‘as a lever to prise open markets sheltered by national regulation’.110  
However, a closer analysis of the case law suggests that, in fact in genuine cases, the Court is 
sensitive to the worker protection objectives of national legislation and will uphold the national rules 
(eg in cases involving particular types of work or sectors and, in respect of posted workers,111 
proportionate control measures) or will at least indicate how existing national rules can be made 
more proportionate to secure worker protection. It is therefore misleading to see all the cases 
where states ‘lost’ as a triumph of worker welfare over worker protection. 
Thus while insights from the consumer literature have been helpful in unpacking what is actually 
going on in the Court’s case law in the cases involving workers, it is important to recognise the 
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differences too between consumers and workers. The first concerns winners and losers. Consumers 
are the passive beneficiaries of the single market: they are either being protected from ‘bad’ goods 
produced elsewhere (consumer protection prevails) or they can access goods produced elsewhere 
(consumer welfare prevails). By contrast, workers under Article 45 TFEU, and posted workers under 
Article 56 TFEU, are active beneficiaries of the single market. They are doing exactly what the Treaty 
envisages. For individual migrant/posted workers the worker welfare approach is advantageous; for 
weak, ill-educated individual consumers, the consumer welfare approach may be disadvantageous.  
The second concerns the social consequences of prioritising consumer/worker welfare. In the field of 
goods or services, there is an assumption of almost unlimited supply and that consumers are not 
competing with each other for particular products. This may not be the case with jobs, especially in a 
contracting economy. In the case of scarcity, the loss of a product may be upsetting to a consumer; 
the loss of a job may be devastating to (ex-) workers and their families. So the opening up of the fruit 
liqueur market in the name of consumer welfare is a win for consumers (although not necessarily in 
the longer term for the domestic manufacturers and their workers). By contrast, the opening up of 
the services market is a win for the migrant (posted) worker but may be a loss for the non-migrant 
worker. These arguments of substitution are contested but they are politically and psychologically 
resonant.112 For this reason, when the Court prioritises worker welfare over worker protection there 
may be serious political consequences, as the aftermath of the judgments in Laval and Viking have 
shown. 
The third concerns the regulatory consequences of a decision to prioritise consumer/worker welfare. 
The removal of regulatory barriers created by national consumer protection legislation in the name 
of consumer welfare can be serious but compensated for to a large extent by reregulating at EU 
level. This is not the case with employment law and policy. The removal of any national social law in 
recent years has not been matched by re-regulation at EU level. Despite the expansion of EU 
competence in the social field, this has not been matched by an increased political will to use that 
increased competence.113 As the Monti II114 debacle has so clearly shown,115 it is very difficult to 
                                                          
112 See eg J. Kawalerowicz, ‘Perception of immigration level, rather than actual change in local areas, explains 
the UKIP vote, LSE EUROPP, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/06/04/perception-of-immigration-levels-
rather-than-actual-change-in-local-areas-explains-the-ukip-
vote/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Europp+%28EUROPP+-
+European+Politics+and+Policy+at+LSE%29 
113 See C. Barnard, EU Employment Law (Oxford, OUP, 2012), chaps. 1 and 2. 
114 COM(2012) 130. 
reach agreement at EU level on new substantive social legislation (with the exception of legislation 
on enforcement).116 So to proponents of the maintenance of national social models, the removal of 
any national social rules in the name of worker welfare is a further nail in the coffin of social 
structures which have been built up over decades as part of the fabric of national life. Sometimes, as 
in Spain and Italy, that fabric may become a straitjacket for adapting to modern conditions. In other 
countries, such as Germany that infrastructure may be one of the explanations for its economic 
success.117 The Court must tread carefully; this chapter shows that in many – but not all - cases it 
does. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
115 See further M. Freedland and J. Prassl, Viking, Laval and beyond (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014), especially 
chap. 5. 
116 Although cf the new proposal on Posted Workers: COM(2016) 128. Nine Member States have come out to 
say they are opposed to the measure. 
117 See P. Hall and D. Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in B. Hancké (ed), Debating Varieties 
of Capitalism: A Reader (Oxford, OUP, 2009). 
